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GAPING HOLE: DARNING INTERNATIONAL 
CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
DISASTERS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
VERONICA THREADGILL* 
I. Introduction 
Transnational corporations (TNCs) are unique creatures, wielding 
significant financial and political influence, with the ability to able to 
escape the consequences that keep nations and other international 
organizations in line with the laws governing the protection of human rights 
and the environment. Many TNCs have exploited this blind spot in 
international law to achieve profit-seeking goals. Before the emergence of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the late 20th century, corporations 
served one master – the shareholder – and their single duty was to 
maximize earnings.1 As corporations came under fire following various 
scandals that generated media publicity, the idea that corporations owe 
more than a simple fiduciary duty to the society in which they operate 
began to garner support.2  
Encouraging corporations to adopt a more socially-conscious mindset, 
however, is simply that – encouragement. There are no mechanisms in 
place that require corporations to behave in responsible ways, beyond 
adherence to domestic law. National oversight is inconsistent, and thus the 
                                                                                                                 
 * The author is a second-year law student at the University of Oklahoma. I would like 
to thank my family for their unending support. I am forever grateful for their love and 
encouragement.  
 1. RICHARD T. DE GEORGE, Business Ethics, 10 (7th ed. 2011) (ebook). 
 2. See infra Part III, notes (for a discussion on the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico 
and Royal Dutch Shell’s activities in Nigeria). 
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range of tolerated behaviors varies significantly. Human rights violations 
tend to go hand-in-hand with companies operating in the oil, gas, and 
natural resource industries. The discovery of valuable natural resources, be 
it oil or cobalt, generally promises an economic windfall for a community; 
however, such unearthing can lead to destabilization, financial turmoil, 
violence, and repression. A hopeful harbinger turns into a cruel catalyst for 
oppression. The discovery of mineral and energy resources has spawned 
civil wars and violent, economically turbulent eras.3 In ongoing conflict 
areas, matters are exacerbated. Transnational corporations are frequently 
involved in human rights violations via two avenues. TNCs may violate 
rights either directly through the exploitation of labor or the creation of 
environmental hazards. Such corporations may also be involved in 
violations indirectly through financial infusions that are redirected to 
support violent, oppressive regimes or to hire security that commits heinous 
acts against local populations. Countries, particularly those that are reliant 
on the infusions of capital brought about from the presence of TNCs, are 
not keen on giving their golden gooses the boot. Accountability, however, 
must come from somewhere.  
By highlighting the interplay of environmental rights and human rights 
law, there is potential for international organizations to use economic 
measures and criminal liability to police the actions of TNCs, particularly 
those which specialize in oil, gas, and natural resources. While the concept 
of encapsulating environmental rights into human rights law is not new, it is 
still relatively novel. Through further incorporation of environmental rights 
into the body of human rights law, more avenues for holding TNCs 
accountable become viable. By anticipating the growing trend in the 
international community, TNCs in the oil, gas, and natural resource 
industries can begin preparations for more stringent environmental and 
human rights compliance. Such a shift in international law will have 
sweeping impacts and a particularly poignant effect on TNCs in the 
extractive industries. 
When the Exxon Valdez oil spill occurred in Alaska, it made sense for 
the United States to press criminal charges against Exxon Mobil.4 Exxon is 
                                                                                                                 
 3. Roy Maconachie et. al., World Bank Group [WBG], Responding to the Challenge of 
Fragility and Security in West Africa: Natural Resources, Extractive Industry, Investment, 
and Social Conflict, at 5 nn.1-2, 98902 (2015), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/ 
169321468189569256/pdf/98902-WP-AFR-P148420-Box-393185B-PUBLIC-Extractives-
FINAL.pdf 
 4. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 476 (2008). 
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an American company, and the oil spill happened in U.S. waters.5 
Prosecution, therefore, was jurisdictionally straightforward. The resulting 
financial payments to the United States were redirected to clean up efforts. 
The victims of the oil spill whose livelihoods were negatively impacted by 
the spill only received compensation nearly 20 years after the incident, and 
the Supreme Court awarded damages significantly smaller than initially 
expected.6 Had this entity been a foreign oil company or had the oil spill 
occurred elsewhere in the world, it is unclear who would have been able to 
hold Exxon accountable. The legal framework needs a serious overhaul to 
address such blatant gaps in liability. 
The difficulty with attempting to regulate TNCs is the absence of any 
regulatory scheme which gives the appropriate authority for governing 
agencies to bring charges against corporations and responsible individuals 
for their crimes. Even when indirectly attacking a TNC, determining the 
applicable international law to apply is difficult. The World Trade 
Organization (WTO) has the potential to act as a regulatory body by 
imposing sanctions on countries. This direction would require the 
organization to transcend its original purpose of promoting trade while 
having no direct effect on corporations, and is therefore a potential, but not 
best suited, avenue. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) also have potential to hold states 
accountable for human rights violations that occur within their territories 
and under their jurisdiction, but, again, this method circumvents TNC 
liability. Therefore, the most promising route is reworking the International 
Criminal Court and the Rome Statute, which currently addresses individual 
liability for grievous crimes, to encompass environmental disasters and 
human rights violations.  
II. Environmental law principles 
It is important to first understand the core principles of environmental 
law, both those that are currently customary – and therefore binding – and 
those that are on track to becoming customary law. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 5. Id. 
 6. Kim Murphy, Exxon Valdez victims finally getting payout, THE SEATTLE TIMES, 
Dec. 7, 2008, https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/exxon-valdez-victims-finally-
getting-payout/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2019). 
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A. “No Harm” Principle  
The invigorated environmental movements of the mid-20th century 
brought revitalized initiatives from international bodies, building on past 
environmental principles. The cornerstone principle of “No Harm” was 
concretely championed in the Trail Smelter Arbitration, a dispute between 
the United States and Canada.7 The Canadian corporation Trail Smelter was 
emitting sulfur dioxide, which caused damage in the form of air pollution in 
the state of Washington.8 Relying on case law from water pollution rights in 
the United States, as well as a theory on cantonal autonomy from Swiss 
law, The Arbitral Tribunal monumentally determined: 
[N]o State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in 
such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory 
of another or the properties or persons therein, when the case is 
of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and 
convincing evidence.9 
This decision created the foothold for other important environmental law 
developments to cling. The Arbitral Tribunal solidified a state’s duty to 
refrain from activities that will negatively impact their neighbors, but also 
emphasized that States have an additional duty to ensure that private actors 
within their territory do not cause transboundary harm. This principle of 
state responsibility for private actors is a key point in linking the 
responsibility for TNCs to their countries of incorporation. The “No Harm” 
principle also appears in Principle 21 of the 1972 Declaration of the United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm Declaration), a 
comprehensive document linking environmental rights to human rights.10 
The Stockholm Declaration is not legally binding on the international 
community but is rather an iteration of internationally agreed-upon 
environmental principles. The Declaration serves in the effort to solidify the 
slightly-idealistic aspirations of environmental law, paving the way for 
binding law. The Earth Summit of 1992 birthed the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development (Rio Declaration), which regurgitated many 
of the principles of the Stockholm Declaration, including the rule of “No 
                                                                                                                 
 7. Arbitral Trib., 3 U.N. Rep. Int’l Arb. Awards – Trail Smelter Case 1905 (1941). 
 8. Id. at 1917. 
 9. Id. at 1965. 
 10. U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm Declaration, U.N. Doc 
A/CONF.48/14/Rev.I, (1973) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration]. 
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Harm.”11 At that same summit, parties ratified the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which also 
includes the idea that while States have the “sovereign right to exploit their 
own resources,” they also have “the responsibility to ensure that activities 
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment 
of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”12  
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) weighed in on the issue with its 
1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons. This document referenced the Rio Declaration to remind States 
of their obligation to consider the transboundary environmental effects that 
nuclear weapons are capable of causing.13 The ICJ argued that the use of 
nuclear weapons would violate the instruments relating to the protection of 
the environment.14 Today, the “No Harm” principle is part of the body of 
binding customary international law, due to its pervasive nature and 
widespread acceptance. This tenet of environmental law is essential in 
directing responsibility for environmental wrongs to the liable State. At the 
very least, the onus rests on that State, but ideally, within this paper’s 
proposed framework, the State would be able to shift responsibility for the 
causation of trans-boundary harm to a more-accountable TNC. 
B. Procedural Rights 
There are important environmental procedural rights that carry weight as 
well. The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) 
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus 
Convention) binds parties to its provisional matters concerning procedural 
rights.15 Highlighting the document’s importance, the UNECE describes the 
document as the “only legally binding global instruments on environmental 
                                                                                                                 
 11. .U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc.A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol.1) annex I, (Aug. 12, 
1992). 
 12. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1, S. Treaty Doc No. 
102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 (May 9, 1992). 
 13. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
95, 4 (July 8). 
 14. Id. 
 15. U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, Convention on Access to Information, 
Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, 
June 15, 1998, 2161 UNTS 447; 38 ILM 517 (1999) [hereinafter Aarhus Convention]. 
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democracy.”16 These environmental rights, as indicated in the Convention’s 
title, require national authorities to make information available to the public 
regarding a wide variety of environmental issues.17 The Convention also 
mandates the manner in which States must create means of redress 
regarding environmental concerns through a judicial system18 and provides 
the public with the right to participate in decision-making regarding certain 
activities.19 These rights mirror those found in the International Bill of 
Rights, namely those in the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR)20 and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
(UDHR),21 both overwhelmingly critical documents in the realm of human 
rights.  
TNCs, in conjunction with local governments, often pose threats to both 
the principle of “No Harm” and certain guaranteed procedural rights 
through their operations. Extractive operations are certain to affect the 
environment and health of neighboring States, and close relationships with 
governments are prone to result in either blocked access to the judicial 
system or diminished chances that grievances will result in favorable 
outcomes to persons affected by TNC activities. Particularly when TNCs 
operate in areas with repressive governments, the incentive to protect the 
oft-lucrative extractive industry incentivizes governments to neglect the 
local population’s democratic rights in general, nevertheless those 
regarding environmental justice.  
II. Relationship between human rights and environment 
Several major international bodies have articulated the connection 
between human rights and environmental law. The Aarhus Convention’s 
valuable relationship to human rights stems from part of the statement of 
purpose, proclaiming that “adequate protection of the environment is 
essential to…the enjoyment of basic human rights, including the right to 
life itself.”22 Quick to follow, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
                                                                                                                 
 16. Public Participation, UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE, 
http://www.unece.org/env/pp/welcome.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2018). 
 17. Aarhus Convention, supra note 15, art. 4. 
 18. Id. art. 9. 
 19. Id. art. 6. 
 20. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966 999 U.N.T.S. 
171; S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978); S. Treaty Doc. 95-20; 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967). 
 21. .G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948). . 
 22. Aarhus Convention, supra note 15. 
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European Union explicitly provides for environmental protection in Article 
37: 
A high level of environmental protection and the improvement 
of the quality of the environment must be integrated into the 
policies of the Union and ensured in accordance with the 
principle of sustainable development.23 
UN Human Rights Council Resolution 7/23 of March 200924 and 
Resolution 16/11 of April 2011 both highlight how the effects of climate 
change can have negative effects on the enjoyment of human rights.25 Both 
Resolutions essentially requested that the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights undertake a “detailed analytical study on 
the relationship between climate change and human rights,” recognizing 
that the two areas of law are dependent upon the other.26 Specifically, 
Resolution 16/11 noted that “sustainable development and the protection of 
the environment can contribute to human well-being and the enjoyment of 
human rights” and that “environmental damage can have negative 
implications…for the effective enjoyment of human rights.”27  
The United Nations (UN) broke the interrelationship between 
environmental rights and human rights into three approaches. First is 
considering the environment as a prerequisite for the enjoyment of human 
rights.28 That is to say, the State must maintain a certain level of 
environmental protection to secure the full exercise of human rights. 
Conversely, a deteriorating environment can hamper a person’s ability to 
fully express their rights. Second is the notion that human rights are a 
prerequisite for a healthy environment; certain human rights must be 
enjoyed in order for “good environmental decision-making.”29 The rights 
championed in the Aarhus Convention, for example, qualify as those that 
involve the public in critical decision-making processes and provide access 
to judicial redress for grievances. Without such procedures, the public’s 
                                                                                                                 
 23. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 47, 2012 O.J. 326. 
 24. U.N. Human Rights Council Res. 7/23, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/18/22 (Oct. 17, 
2011) 
 25. U.N. Human Rights Council Res. 16/11, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/16/L.7 (orally 
revised) (March 24, 2011). 
 26. Id.; See also, U.N. Human Rights Council Res. 7/23, supra note 24. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Human Rights and the Environment, UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, 
http://web.unep.org/divisions/delc/human-rights-and-environment (last visited Dec. 14, 
2018). 
 29. Id. 
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ability to speak and perform their civic duty is crippled. The third and final 
concept is the idea that the right to “a safe, healthy and ecologically-
balanced environment [i]s a human right itself,” which the UN notes is a 
debated approach.30 This eco-centric approach would list a healthy 
environment alongside freedom from torture, instead of visualizing the 
environment as a gateway to human rights expression. The first theory, that 
a healthy environment is essential to the expression of the full spectrum of 
human rights, is the most well-founded and is relevant to this paper. 
Therefore, the other two concepts will not be discussed further. 
The use of the right of respect for private and family life to combat 
environmental wrongs is the best way to exhibit the first model of the 
dependence of human rights upon the well-being of the environment. 
Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) articulates 
that everyone has the right to protection of the law against “arbitrary 
interference with his privacy, [and] family.”31 The European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) also contains a provision allocating this right.32 
Article 8 of the ECHR details the “right to respect for private and family 
life,” a key source in the crusade for transforming environmental harms into 
human rights violations for parties to the Convention.33  
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has applied Article 8 to 
situations when functions of the state have committed environmental harms. 
The Court has also used this provision to impose liability when a state has 
reason to know of environmental harms occurring within its territory or 
jurisdiction and took no action to combat such detriment. The European 
Court of Human Rights has affirmed that “Article 8 may apply in 
environmental cases whether the pollution is directly caused by the State or 
whether State responsibility arises from the failure to regulate private 
industry properly.”34 This principle of State responsibility is critical in 
attempting to create mechanisms for international enforcement of TNCs 
and justifying State responsibility for private actors’ violations of 
fundamental rights. States have a limited responsibility for the actions of 
                                                                                                                 
 30. Id.  
 31. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).  
 32. European Convention on Human Rights, 1953, E.T.S. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (1953) 
(hereinafter ECHR). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Hatton and Others v. United Kingdom, 2003-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 228, para. 98. This 
principle is reiterated more specifically in para. 119: “[T]he State’s responsibility in 
environmental cases may also arise from a failure to regulate private industry in a manner 
securing proper respect for the rights enshrined in Article 8 of the Convention.” 
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private industries as they relate to other nations. Case law regarding the 
application of Article 8 is illuminating.  
A. Lopez Ostra v. Spain (1994) 
Several local tanneries in Lorca, Spain opened a water treatment plant to 
combat the pollution problem resulting from the tanneries’ operations.35 
However, the water treatment plant itself engaged in activities which 
resulted in the emission of foul odors and fumes – namely hydrogen sulfide 
emissions which exceeding a permissible limit – that leeched into the 
town.36 During that time, due to a malfunction at the plant, the town council 
had to evacuate the residents, resulting in a 3-month relocation of Mrs. 
López Ostra and her family.37 For three years, the López Ostra family dealt 
with the noxious environment produced by the water treatment plant before 
ultimately moving as a result of the fumes, smells, and noises having a 
persistent and detrimental impact on their health.38 The European Court 
determined that, while the state has a certain amount of leeway in balancing 
the competing interest of the state’s economic objectives against an 
individual’s effective enjoyment of their rights, here Spain failed to achieve 
that balance.39 The Court found there had been a violation of Mrs. López 
Ostra’s rights under Article 8 of the ECHR as a result of the water treatment 
plant’s activities, emphasizing that “severe environmental pollution may 
affect individuals’ well-being and prevent them from enjoying their homes 
in such a way as to affect their private and family life adversely,” even 
without serious health endangerment.40 The Court ordered Spain to pay 
                                                                                                                 
 35. López Ostra v. Spain A-303-C Eur. Ct. H.R. 46 (1994).  
 36. Id. at para. 7. 
 37. Id. at para. 8. 
 38. Id. at para. 7-8. 
 39. Id. at para. 58; see also, Hatton, supra note 34, which also suggests that a critical 
element for a successful Article 8 claim is unlawfulness of the complained of activities at the 
domestic level. It is critical that the State was also not in compliance with an aspect of a 
domestic regime. That is to say, “the violation [is] predicated on a failure by the national 
authorities to comply with some aspect of the domestic regime.” In Hatton, applicants 
complained of nighttime noise disturbances as a result of night flights into the Heathrow 
airport. However domestic authorities determined that the policy regulating nighttime flights 
was in compliance with domestic law. Hatton partially predicated its decision to refuse to 
find a violation of Article 8 on this compliance. This is contrasted in López Ostra, wherein 
the waste water plant was operating without a proper license, and Guerra and Others, in 
which the State failed to provide applicants with information that the State had a statutory 
obligation to provide. 
 40. López Ostra v. Spain A-303-C Eur. Ct. H.R. 46, at para. 51 (1994). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
812 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 4 
  
 
Mrs. López Ostra four million pesetas in damages, approximately $48,000 
in today’s USD.41 
B. Guerra and Others v. Italy (1998)  
A chemical factory, one kilometer away from the applicants’ town of 
Manfredonia, produced fertilizers and caprolactam, a chemical compound 
“used in the manufacture of synthetic fibres such as nylon.”42 The Italian 
Government classified the factory as “high risk,” based on the potential 
hazards of certain activities deemed dangerous to the environment and local 
populations.43 Indeed, the factory did emit large quantities of inflammable 
gas, including arsenic trioxide. Due to a malfunction-caused explosion, one-
hundred and fifty people were hospitalized due to acute arsenic poisoning.44 
The Court held that Italy failed in its duty to reasonably protect its citizens 
from risk of harm from private actors.45 
C. Tatar v. Romania (2009) 
Around 100,000 cubic meters of cyanide-contaminated tailings water 
spilled into the environment following a dam breach at a gold mine, which 
used sodium cyanide in its gold extraction process.46 The Court found that 
the Romanian authorities “failed in their duty to assess . . . the risks” and 
neglected to enact “suitable measures in order to protect the rights of those 
concerned to respect for their private lives and homes . . . and more 
generally their right to enjoy a healthy and protected environment.”47 This 
case also acknowledges the public’s right to access information and 
participate in the decision-making process “prior to issuance of the 
operating authorization,” essentially ensuring the public has a say in nearby 
operations that could have negative consequences on the environment and 
thus their health.48 The case also touches upon the importance of the 
relevant principles of the Rio Declaration as well as the Aarhus Convention. 
These cases in essence illustrate the deep relationship the environment 
has to facilitating full expression of human rights. This close linkage is 
                                                                                                                 
 41. Id. at 4.  
 42. Guerra v. Italy, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 89.  
 43. Id. at para. 13.  
 44. Id. at para. 15.  
 45. Id. at Summary.  
 46. Press release issued by the Registrar: Chamber Judgment Tatar v. Romania, Eur. Ct. 
H.R (Jan. 27, 2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press?i=003-2615810-2848789 (last 
accessed Dec. 14, 2018). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
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critical to underscore how drastically environmental harms can impact 
human rights and thus the importance of incorporating such environmental 
harms into the body of international criminal law. In the efforts to preserve 
human rights, there must be an international avenue of redress against 
TNCs that negatively impact the environment. 
III. History of TNC accountability for human rights violations 
and current frameworks 
Until this point, the discussion has focused on cases when Courts have 
deemed States accountable for actors within its territory, so it is necessary 
to examine how the countries of the European Union, BRICS, and North 
America have historically handled TNC accountability in order to fully 
grasp the scope of the current climate. First, it is important to understand 
corporate responsibility on an international scale. Corporations are not 
powerless actors.49 They are capable entities whose business decisions 
“directly affect the security or insecurity of local populations.”50 When 
these decisions lead to human rights abuses, such as torture, arbitrary arrest, 
physical injuries, and death, then the corporation should not be able to 
escape accountability, though they often do. The current complaint 
mechanisms available to victims of human rights violations do not offer an 
avenue of redress against corporate actors. Human rights obligations only 
bind nations.51 Additionally, when corporations are only indirectly involved 
in violations, it may be inappropriate to “excessively expand[] corporate 
involvement into human rights issues which remain primarily matters of 
state concern.”52 The corporate social responsibility movement is on the 
rise, and voluntary codes of conduct and self-regulation help manage an 
image of accountability.53 Often, despite the “intentions of corporate 
leaders, [corporate codes of conduct] bear only the remotest connection 
with realities that are often brutal and inhumane.”54  
                                                                                                                 
 49. Scott Pegg, An Emerging Market for the New Millennium: Transnational 
Corporations and Human Rights, in TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 
14 (Jedrezej George Frynas et al. eds.2003) (internal citations omitted).  
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. at 16 (internal citations omitted)  
 52. Id. at 15 (internal citations omitted). 
 53. Id.  
 54. Charles Woolfson & Matthias Beck, Corporate social responsibility failures in the 
oil industry, in BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: DILEMMAS AND SOLUTIONS 114, 121 (Rory 
Sullivan ed., 20013) (E-book). 
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However, while meaningful legal liability under national and 
international law is still, at the moment, woefully lacking, “there is no 
logical reason that corporations cannot bear human rights-related 
obligations.”55 Indeed, this trend is on the uptake. There have been several 
instances that have drawn international attention, with varying levels of 
corporate legal liability attached in response. 
A. Royal Dutch Shell Nigeria 
 The activities of Royal Dutch Shell in Nigeria are some of the most 
well-known in the context of oil companies and human rights violations and 
serves as a classic example.56 Royal Dutch Shell, Nigeria’s largest onshore 
oil company at the time, worked closely with the government to ensure 
operations would run smoothly and successfully.57 Revenue from oil began 
filtering into the government, bypassing the natives of the production areas, 
who suffered the brunt of the company’s damage to the environment and 
their well-being.58 As a result, antagonism against oil industry rose 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s as oil production also rose and the negative 
environmental effects of Shell’s presence began to show.59 Most notably, 
oil spills contaminated the water, damaging the livelihoods of farmers and 
ordinary locals.  
As it became abundantly clear to the locals that the Nigerian government 
would do nothing to impede the environmental degradation resulting from 
oil spills and seismic disturbances, they shifted their focus to plead to Shell 
for relief. Villagers requested compensation for their losses as a result of 
pollution and became understandably disgruntled when these pleas went 
ignored.60  
In an effort to shield the interests of the oil industry, the Nigerian 
government began targeting growing protests by restricting various political 
and economic rights – such as peaceful assembly – as well as infringing on 
some of the most fundamental human rights, such as freedom from arbitrary 
arrest and detention.61 The Nigerian government indiscriminately arrested 
                                                                                                                 
 55. Pegg, supra note 49, at 16.  
 56. Jedrzej George Frynas, The Oil Industry in Nigeria: Conflict between Oil 
Companies and Local People, in TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 99, 
99 (Jedrezej George Frynas et. al ed., 2003). 
 57. Id. at 101-103. 
 58. Id. at 102. 
 59. Id. at 101. 
 60. Id. at 102. 
 61. Id. at 104. 
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critics of the oil industry and seized the property of locals in the name of 
furthering oil production.62 In this way, the presence of a TNC in Nigeria 
indirectly contributed to the human rights abuses of the locals.63 More 
severely, there is documentation to suggest that Shell employed the 
protection of a Nigerian security force well-known for its brutality to 
protect its assets against protesters; this security force then massacred a 
small village on flimsy evidence of an impending attack on Shell’s oil 
facilities.64 While the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
found Nigeria to be in violation of several provisions of the African Charter 
of Human and People’s Rights, Shell escaped relatively unscathed.65 
Scattered lawsuits in the United States (see below) and the Netherlands 
resulted in settlements to compensate the Ogoni community for the 
environmental and human rights violations sustained.66 This legal response 
likely only occurred because this situation drew extreme attention from the 
international community. 
B. Piper Alpha Disaster 
The 1988 Piper Alpha disaster, an explosion of an oil production 
platform in the North Sea which killed 167 people, resulted due to a laundry 
list of safety failures on the part of the platform’s owner, American 
company Occidental.67 These safety failures directly implicated the 
company’s management in the disaster.68 Gross disregards for safety over 
time also indicated that the regulatory body charged with maintaining 
oversight of the offshore industry also shouldered some of the blame.69 
Without the so-called ‘regulatory capture’ of the regulating agency 
responsible for monitoring the offshore industry, Occidental’s management 
failures would not have been possible.70 This regulatory capture happened 
when the oversight body came to associate “‘the public good’ with the 
interest of the industry.”71 This conflict of interest partially arose when the 
Health and Safety Executive (HSE), the UK’s primary safety agency, was 
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not given responsibility for monitoring offshore safety.72 The Scottish High 
Court also implicated anti-union practices as part of the oversight problem. 
As an effect of limiting political rights in the workplace, the 
“disempowered workforce was unable or reluctant to speak out on safety 
issues for fear of management retribution.”73 Occidental managed to slip by 
without a single manslaughter charge against management personnel or 
prosecution for health and safety legislation breaches.74 Only the public 
outcry surrounding the event brought judicial scrutiny in the form of a 
judicial report on what went awry. The slow government response, based 
solely on public reaction, is troubling. The government “essentially cease[s] 
to play the role of a proactive policy-maker” if the “recognition of 
regulatory failure with regard to safety or the environment is now 
dependent on sustained public reaction to disasters.”75 
Occidental apparently did not learn its lesson from this narrow run-in 
with human rights violations, likely due to the absolute lack of criminal 
repercussions. In 2003, U.S. Special Forces began collaborating with the 
Colombian army in Northern Colombia as ‘advisors.’76 Their objective was 
to “train the Colombian army to protect Occidental’s 500 mile pipeline 
from leftist guerillas.”77 As recently as 2017, rebel group National 
Liberation Army (ELN) forced Occidental to partially suspend operations.78 
The ELN “opposes the presence of multinational companies in the mining 
and oil sector, claiming that they seize natural resources without leaving 
benefits to the country’s population or economy.”79 
C. Deepwater Horizon 
Similar to the Piper Alpha disaster, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill of 
2010 saw BP and its executives escape with little more than clean-up fees 
and a tarnished reputation. Prosecutors dropped manslaughter charges 
regarding the eleven deaths, and there was no effective criminal punishment 
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for the environmental devastation that wreaked havoc on the Gulf of 
Mexico.80 
D. United Kingdom 
Common-law countries have also been liberal in allowing foreign suits to 
be brought against domestic companies. In the United Kingdom, the courts 
allowed a suit to be brought against a parent company for the actions of its 
subsidiaries abroad. A uranium mine worker in Namibia, who developed 
cancer of the larynx allegedly as a result of inhaling silica uranium at the 
mine,81 was able to bring a suit in England against Rio Tinto PLC, over the 
mine’s health hazards, despite the court acknowledging Namibia as the 
proper venue.82 The court effectively recognized that the worker would be 
unable to obtain legal assistance or relief if the case was not heard in 
England.83 The Court determined that substantial justice could not be 
carried out in Namibia, making England the more appropriate forum for 
justice. Similarly, judges allowed a lawsuit against Thor Chemicals, 
alleging mercury poisoning of its workers, to proceed in an English venue.84 
Four workers died from exposure to mercury in the factory.85 Thor 
Chemicals eventually settled out of court.86 
E. Alien Tort Claims Act  
The United States, along with the United Kingdom, is in a relatively 
unique position due to the jurisdictional anomaly of the Alien Tort Claims 
Act, enacted so that victims of piracy on the high seas could seek redress in 
the United States. Foreigners have utilized this Act to bring claims against 
U.S.-based corporations for human rights abuses committed abroad. For 
example, Burmese residents were successful in bringing a suit in a U.S. 
District Court against Unocal, a U.S.-based oil company, for allegations 
that the company was complicit in aiding and abetting Burmese authorities 
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in committing human rights violations.87 Other foreigners were also 
successful in bringing suits against U.S. companies such as in Botowo v. 
ChevronTexaco Corp., a cause of action against Chevron for its “role in 
transporting Nigerian military troops on two separate occasions to locations 
where non-violent protestors were subsequently killed and injured.”88 
Similarly, a judge allowed a case brought by the son of a Nigerian activist 
and outspoken critic of Shell in Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Company 
and Shell Transport and Trading Company PLC to move forward. Wiwa 
accused Shell of facilitating the writer’s death.89 Shell quickly settled Wiwa, 
the most promising of the two cases, shortly before the trial was set to 
begin, escaping a potential doling of justice.90 
Indonesia provides another case study regarding mining in conflict zones 
and the potential for litigious response in the United States. Indonesia had a 
weak, corrupt institution, which resulted in another clash between human 
rights and natural resource extraction.91 U.S. miner Freeport-McMoRan 
owned and operated one of the world’s largest copper and gold mines and 
established a mining town in Indonesia to oversee the mine’s operations.92 
While Freeport owned the mine “all surface and sub-surface resources 
belonged to the [Indonesian] government.”93 Keeping with tradition, 
tensions between the mining company and the local population began to 
escalate. In 1996, the locals had initiated riots in Freeport’s mining town of 
Tembagapura and the nearby town of Timika.94 In one such instance, 
fighters shot at several company vehicles, killing one employee and 
wounding several others.95 Following this incident, the mining company 
asked the Indonesian government “to provide sufficient protection to allow 
the mine to continue operating and for its employees to be able to live and 
work without fear.”96 Eventually, security forces protecting the mining 
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operations eventually came into conflict with freedom fighters, which 
brought allegations of human rights violations.97 Authorities attributed the 
attack to the Free Papua Movement (OPM), with whom Freeport had 
several incidences.98 In response to the attack: 
In order to facilitate the capture of the OPM operatives the 
government security forces took about 20 local people into 
custody, some of whom have never been found and are 
presumed dead; others, including women, were locked in 
shipping boxes under inhumane conditions.99 
In April 1996, two lawsuits were lodged in U.S. courts, “both alleging 
human rights violations against the local people by the Indonesian security 
forces supported by Freeport.”100 One lawsuit was filed in the U.S. District 
Court in New Orleans and the other was filed in Louisiana state court, on 
behalf of two indigenous Amungme persons.101 Despite Freeport’s direct 
involvement in the human rights abuses, the suits alleged that “Freeport 
supported Indonesian security forces in committing human rights abuses, 
polluted traditional lands with mine tailings, and attempted ‘cultural 
genocide’ on the local people.”102 Many of the locals believed that the 
existence and operation of the Freeport mine was the catalyst for the human 
rights abuses; without Freeport operating in the area, none of these abuses 
would have occurred.103 These circumstances again probe the issue of 
whether the relationship between the extractive company and the 
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government security forces is attenuated enough to indicate complicity on 
behalf of the TNC.  
F. BRICS countries 
In the BRICS countries – Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South 
Africa – there is very little precedent on this issue of corporate liability, 
which alone should speak to the necessity for an international system that 
has some form of TNC accountability. It is unlikely that the lack of cases 
from these countries is due to an absence of violations. It is more 
conceivable that violations do occur but go unreported, because of either 
lack of an avenue in which to lodge a complaint or for fear of reprisals. 
TNCs in the BRICS countries have several commonalities. The largest ones 
are primarily state-owned, state-operated, or state-influenced, and most of 
the notable companies have long histories of environmental disasters, such 
as oil spills or pipeline explosions. Most of the major extractive industry 
companies are majority state-owned, creating a double-insulation effect 
against lawsuits and liability. State sovereignty acts as a shield, deterring 
potential lawsuits. Cases that are able to gain traction are often buried with 
money. This problem is exacerbated when abuses occur within a State’s 
own borders.  
Two major companies in India, Hindustan Zinc Ltd. and National 
Mineral Development Corporation, both operate exclusively within India’s 
territory.104 This method of operation makes it difficult for a country to 
exercise its autonomy and eject a TNC from its borders for its 
environmental, human rights abuses, as Gabon did with China’s Sinopec 
Limited.105 Gabon was forced to suspend Sinopec’s operations due to 
concerns regarding its environmentally damaging methods, particularly 
regarding the company’s seismic activities and the corresponding 
detrimental effects on local gorilla populations.106 Again, though, this TNC 
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suffered only a financial setback; no meaningful punishment or retribution 
for the environmental damage suffered by the people of Gabon ever 
occurred.107 Such is the pattern.  
To call Russia a major player in the oil and gas industry would be an 
understatement. The European continent is reliant on Russian-supplied oil 
and gas. Two major corporations, Lukoil and Gazprom, have mammoth 
reach around the globe. Lukoil is involved in numerous projects for the 
exploration and development in countries across the globe. The company 
carries out oil and natural gas operations, in Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Italy, the 
Netherlands Ghana, Egypt, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Cameroon, Mexico, Nigeria, 
Norway, Romania, and Uzbekistan.108 Lukoil sells oil and petroleum 
products to most of Eastern Europe, and the TNC even conducts geological 
exploration and production from its subsidiary in Houston, Texas.109 Even 
with massive global operations, the majority of Lukoil’s operations and 
exploration occur within Russia’s borders110. The company is also primarily 
responsible for oil leaks from the Usinsk oil field, which total yearly to 
twice the amount of oil emitted in the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill.111 
The amount of damage wrought on the environment in northern Russia is 
currently untold. As the primary licenser for the oil field, the Lukoil bears 
the corresponding primary responsibility. However, due to poor oversight 
and easily-paid fines, there is little incentive for the Russian oil giant to 
mend its ways. Not one to play by the rules, Russia is unlikely to initiate 
stricter enforcement for its massively profitable oil and natural gas industry, 
which has average returns “twice as high as in other countries . . . thanks to 
huge government tax breaks and subsidies.”112 And with Russia’s recent 
snub to the ECtHR, strong international oversight and criminal 
responsibility for corporations seems like the most viable option.113 Rather 
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than targeting the contentious country itself, the international community 
could seek redress through its state-owned interests. 
Hindustan Zinc Ltd., referenced earlier, is the second-largest producer of 
zinc in the world. The corporation was also named to RobecoSAM’s 
Corporate Sustainability Assessment Yearbook in 2018.114 RobecoSAM 
nominates the most sustainable companies in each major industry. The 
Yearbook mention makes Hindustan Zinc effectively an ‘honorable 
mention.’115 This accolade came less than two years after a complaint was 
lodged before the National Green Tribunal against the corporation. The 
plaintiffs alleged that “as a result of the mining activity and non-compliance 
of preventative measures,” the community has suffered a myriad of 
environmental problems, including reduced and polluted drinking water.116 
The complaint attributed 111 deaths as a result of Hindustan’s operations.117 
The judgment by the Tribunal indicated the contrary, though the judgment 
was lukewarm and relatively indefinite.118 At present, India is party to 
several United Nations human rights treaties but is not a party to either of 
the Optional Protocols to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights or the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights which allows individual citizens to lodge a complaint against India 
for alleged human rights violations.119 Unless India becomes a party to the 
Optional Protocols, there is no individual avenue of redress against the 
state, nevertheless state-owned corporations. 
The presence of Sinopec Limited, has caused aggravated tensions 
between Somalia and Ethiopia due to its oil exploration into the African 
continent. The Ogaden National Liberation Front, an ethnic Somali group, 
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killed 74 workers at a Sinopec oilfield in 2007.120 The oilfield is in part of 
Ethiopia that is comprised primarily of ethnic Somalis. The rebel group 
claimed they carried out the attack to discourage the oil industry’s 
operations, which financially benefit the Ethiopian government. The 
majority of the workers killed were Ethiopian. The company has also been 
named as a chronic river polluter by a watchdog group in China as a result 
of its role in polluting some of China’s major rivers.121 The State 
Environmental Protection Administration gave what was effectively a slap 
on the wrist in response.122 
The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has an even more 
woeful environmental record. CNPC has been responsible for several 
devastating environmental and human rights disasters in the last fifteen 
years. In 2003, at least 191 people were killed as the result of an explosion 
in a natural gas field under the control of CNPC.123 It is likely that the 
accident was a result of “poor safety procedures or faulty rescue 
operations,” indicated by the “high death toll and the long lag in reporting 
accurate information” regarding the accident.124 In 2005, an explosion in 
Jilin resulted in a “50-mile slick of toxic benzene” that reached the Songhua 
River.125 In 2010, damaged pipeline owned by CNPC resulted in a large oil 
spill in the Xiangang Port that threatened to pollute the Yellow River.126 
Chinese authorities were unsurprisingly vague when referencing the extent 
and cause of the damage, as well as the delayed response.127  
CNPC’s behavior in Chad was so deplorable that the Chad government 
suspended CNPC’s operations after an oil spill in “several sites near a 
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forest.”128 The oil minister of Chad detailed how CNPC “dug huge trenches 
and let oil flow into them, and then had it removed by local workers 
without protective gear.”129 The Chad government threatened to hold the 
company’s managers responsible for unspecified criminal violations.130 
This laundry list of environmental disasters which have all had 
detrimental impact to the environment and human rights in China are 
symptomatic of a larger problem for the country, namely the lack of any 
accountability. China is identical to India in its lack of an individual-
complaints procedure for victims of human rights violations at the hands of 
the government or its TNCs.131 The ability of the Chinese government to be 
so well-insulated against any repercussions for the atrocious environmental 
record of its corporations bespeaks of the larger need for change in the 
defunct system. 
The operations of two of Brazil’s largest TNCs offer a dichotomous view 
that reflects the behavior of TNCs in BRICS countries in general. In 2011, 
Vale (S.A.), a multinational corporation involved in mining iron ore, nickel, 
and other minerals, announced it would invest “an estimated $2 billion in 
the world’s most controversial hydroelectric dam project.”132 Critics of the 
Belo Monte dam in the Brazilian Amazon have alleged that Brazil’s 
government was dismissive of native tribes and locals regarding the 
environmental impact the dam would have on the surrounding areas.133  
In contrast, Petrobras, a corporation majority-owned by the Brazilian 
government with a global reach, was responsible for a stream of major oil 
spills from the mid-70s until 2001, when the company undertook a major 
corporate social overhaul. Since then, Petrobras has become a member of 
the National Oil Spill Contingency Plan for Brazil, conducts emergency 
drills to respond to spills,134 and adopted a Zero Spill plan to minimize oil 
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spill risk.135 The company has also doubled down on other commitments to 
environmental safety, undertaking an active and successful conservation 
effort to rebuild the humpback whale population in Brazilian waters. 
Petrobras also funds the Tamar Project, which protects sea turtle habitats in 
Brazil. This level of corporate social responsibility does not just 
materialize. The public image overhaul landed Petrobras on the Dow Jones 
Sustainable Index from 2006-2015 due to its environmental philanthropy.  
Setting Brazil apart from the other BRICS countries is Brazil’s relatively 
clean record regarding oil and gas, and extractive resource companies’ 
operations. While the hydroelectric dam in the Amazon is sure to raise 
human rights issues in the future, there is little to be found to implicate a 
checkered history of violating human rights by oil companies in similar 
ways as Russia and China. Setting Brazil further apart is the fact that Brazil 
has accepted the Additional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights which allows for individual complaints to potentially 
be heard by the Human Rights Council.136 In the future, should human 
rights or indigenous groups have complaints against Brazil for its 
operations, there is a direct avenue of redress against the country, though 
still not the corporations themselves. 
South Africa, the last of the BRICS countries, is home to one of the 
largest gold producers in the world – AngloGold Ashanti. The company 
began gold mining in the Democratic Republic of the Congo after 
establishing a relationship with the Nationalist and Integrationist Front 
(FNI), “an armed group responsible for serious human rights abuses 
including war crimes and crimes against humanity.”137 AngloGold’s 
partnership with FNI provided AngloGold with “security for its operations 
and staff” while AngloGold provided “logistical and financial support” to 
FNI.138 When FNI asked for money, they got it.139 HRW claims the 
company “knew, or should have known, that the FNI armed group had 
committed grave human rights abuses against civilians and was not a party 
to the transitional government” in the DRC. This direct involvement with a 
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group committing human rights abuses in the extreme is the most heinous 
example from the five countries. South Africa is party to the Additional 
Protocol allowing for acceptance of individual complaints under the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which would provide 
avenues of redress for some of the victims of FNI’s conduct.140  
Beyond countries with relatively accessible records, there also lies the 
problem where an information vacuum impacts the ability to act. In 
countries such as Angola, Algeria, Burma, Cameroon, Chad, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Gabon, Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, Peru, Venezuela, “collaboration 
between repressive regimes and oil multinationals has been documented 
only incompletely.”141 Thus the need for human rights aid and a more direct 
avenue to justice against these multinationals is not fully realized. 
 The current system allows for deflection by secondarily-responsible 
countries, or financial penalties are taken after the fact, doing little to deter 
infringements in the first place. There must be accountability, which the 
current system is failing to provide, for the actions of international 
companies which devastate both the environment and basic human rights. 
Companies are complacent and neglect environmental human rights until 
the public’s outcry is too loud to ignore or until tragedy has struck. In either 
instance, governments are failing in their duties. Governments are either 
incapable of policing TNC behavior, due to poor political infrastructure or a 
lack of resources, or because of the government’s complicity in the 
corporation’s operations. Money acts as an escape hatch from the rare 
opportunities for true legal reprisals. A separate and independent regime is 
needed for meaningful accountability. 
IV. How to hold TNCs internationally accountable for their actions? 
Transnational corporations should be interested in preventing human 
rights violations, even beyond potential international pressure. TNCs 
humanitarianism should logically stem, first and foremost, from the 
benevolent desire to do good. Nongovernmental organizations have 
recognized the role that TNCs could play in improving human rights 
conditions surrounding their businesses.142 Unfortunately, such public-
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mindedness often conflicts with the usual profit agenda. There are certain 
countries in which corporations cannot possibly invest without directly 
contributing to serious human rights violations, and again, absent a 
“mandate to be autonomous actors in international relations,” TNCs lack 
incentive to comply where corporate profits deviate from preserving human 
and environmental rights.143  
The justification that “rich and developing countries do not make the 
same demands in respect of human rights,” and therefore TNCs can 
somehow rationalize operating at some lower standard wholly misses the 
crux of human rights law.144 All persons are entitled to a basic level of 
treatment that bears no justification for deviation. The existence of an 
international system with the ability “to enforce a legal obligation on 
[TNCs] to take human rights related action… would be in the interest of the 
controlling shareholders for the company to comply with these legal 
rules.”145 Absent such a supervisory system, however, controlling 
stakeholders are not under pressure to comply with a regime that has no 
direct effect on their operations. It is only when the overall corporate 
interest becomes dependent upon human rights promotion, that the 
company’s nature will shift to emphasize compliance.146 At current, it is 
mostly reputational damage with consumers – social pressures – that result 
in lost business that shapes corporate thinking.147 Thus TNCs need to be 
accountable to a higher power with the authority to mete punishment and 
administer justice. 
It is optimistic, and perhaps juvenile, to expect that all TNCs would be 
focal points of any scheme imposing liability for abuses. Those TNCs that 
have the potential to be subjects of international liability for human rights 
violations and environmental wrongs should conform to a particular set of 
characteristics. First, the company “originated in a developed country, 
where its head office is still located…[and] controls assets or operations in 
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 147. For example, Nike has faced intense backlash for its child labor practices abroad, 
which has forced the company to overhaul its manufacturing procedures. See JOHN. H 
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a developing country where human rights abuses take place.”148 The 
accumulation of the TNC’s operations makes it one of the largest market 
participants in at least one of its operating fields, including, but not limited 
to resource extraction of manufacturing.149 Potential TNCs include not just 
the “‘usual suspects’ in human rights literature such as oil and mining 
firms, but the whole range of manufacturing, extractive and services 
companies.”150  
The assumption that human rights initiatives by TNCs would be warmly 
welcomed by the local population is also problematic.151 Particularly in 
countries with histories of colonialism and imperialism, local populations 
might be reluctant to embrace foreign human rights intervention.152 This 
problem is exacerbated by the fact that the originators of human rights 
protection and intervention are the former colonizers and imperialists 
themselves, which understandably causes skepticism amongst formerly 
dominated areas.153When the entities exerting human rights influences are 
those that previously participated in violations, such efforts would be 
considerably undermined. At the very worst, “should they emerge as tools 
of foreign political influence . . . certain human rights activities might easily 
be interpreted as mere excuses for political domination.”154 Local 
populations, can be relatively accepting of foreign influence “as long as 
they believe that it is beneficial,” and would accept engagement in “subtle 
forms of human rights promotion” from corporations with whom the 
communities have longstanding relationships.155 These are rare and 
precarious circumstances, and, thus far, allowing corporations to self-police 
for human rights violations has proven ineffective. It is farcical for the 
international community to continue to rely on self-governance and public 
criticisms to curb this disturbing trend. Instead of reliance on TNCs 
themselves for accountability, other avenues must be explored. 
When evaluating TNC liability, it is necessary to first examine the extent 
of TNC’s involvement with environmental human rights abuses to 
determine what level of responsibility is borne by the corporation. There are 
four major factors to consider regarding a transnational corporation’s 
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involvement in potential human rights abuses. First is the matter of degree – 
whether the violations are sporadic and isolated, or planned, systematic, and 
continuous.156 While isolated incidents are still inexcusable, they differ 
strongly from the pattern of a repressive government. Repetitive conduct is 
less likely to be the product of a one-off accident or lapse in judgement; 
systematic violations indicate awareness and perhaps complicity. 
Second is the nature of the violations – are they the direct result of 
government activities or is the government merely impotent when securing 
human rights?157 If a government is merely too weak to effectively protect 
and ensure certain rights, those violations seem to be of a lesser degree than 
when a government is actively seeking to deprive its residents of their 
rights. Some governments are ineffective to the point that they cannot 
respond to human rights violations, regardless of their desire to do so. This 
situation differs from when a government is either participating in the 
human rights abuses or is actively turning a blind eye in order to reap the 
benefits of a TNC’s operations. China, for example, is more than capable of 
responding to the environmental degradation resulting from CNPC’s 
operations but is choosing instead to allay concerns to the best of its ability. 
Third, is the breach regarding fundamental or lesser rights?158 There is 
theoretically no hierarchy within the rights protected in the area of human 
rights law. The fact remains, however, that some rights are ‘non-derogable’ 
during national emergencies, which contradicts that principle. Therefore it 
is important to consider if the corporation violated a right that is non-
derogable or one that is similarly essential such that a violation speaks of 
egregious conduct.  
Lastly, what is the proximity of the corporation to the violations?159 Is 
the connection direct, as through a company’s operations or products, or 
indirect, as through financial infusions into an abusive governing regime?160 
A corporation’s role in creating or worsening violations against local 
populations can be demonstrated either through a corporations catalytic 
effect in bringing about conflict with military forces or directly through 
physical abuses by the corporation or through utilizing military 
assistance.161 The level of a corporation’s involvement and complicity with 
human rights violations is critical in assessing their liability. For example, 
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Shell’s actions in Nigeria were indirect but highly aggravated the situation. 
It is possible that without the presence of Shell and its requests for 
assistance and security that certain violations would not have occurred, 
differing from a situation where the TNC is mostly liable through its 
financial infusions which indirectly fund a corrupt, oppressive regime. 
Two distinct pathways emerge when considering how to hold TNCs 
accountable for their environmental human rights violations: through 
economic sanctions or by pursuing criminal liability, with preferability for 
the latter. While taking economic measures might seem enticing, there are a 
multitude of drawbacks that make this method ultimately undesirable. 
Trade sanctions grapple with political obstacles and the unintended 
consequence of intensifying the behavior the economic punishment seeks to 
discourage. Both pathways, trade sanctions and criminal liability, are 
typically aimed at impacting states. It would be effectively inconceivable 
for an international trade organization to individually target a TNC, but it is 
not so far-fetched to consider expanding international criminal jurisdiction 
for environmental human rights violations to cover corporate liability. 
Given that the ICC can already hold individuals responsible for specific 
international crimes, the concept of expanding the Court’s jurisdiction to 
encompass TNCs and their environmental human rights crimes is not a far-
fetched concept. Nor is it unrealistic in the modern climate for countries to 
support modifications to their human rights treaties to hold TNCs 
accountable, rather than be the scapegoat themselves.  
A. Trade Sanctions 
It is in the interest of trade organizations to pursue long-term human 
rights goals, which are preconditions for successful trade. Human rights not 
only make individuals better democratic citizens but also better economic 
actors.162 The UN General Assembly in 1999 emphasized the need to 
analyze the consequences of globalization for human rights: 
[While] increased trade and investment has brought significant 
benefits to many nations and people…trade liberalization can 
lead to widening disparities between and within nations, increase 
people’s vulnerability to external economic variations and 
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shocks and as a result put at risk the realization of fundamental 
human rights.163 
International organizations must look to human rights standards as the 
foundational basis from which they create their policies.164 While the World 
Trade Organization Agreements currently have limited exceptions in their 
frameworks to allow for deviations from Member obligations, there is room 
to expand the organization’s emphasis on human rights. Article XX of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) allows unilateral actions 
by WTO Members to make exceptions to protect health and conservation. 
Specifically, Members can take trade-restrictive measures on products that 
are “necessary to protect public morals,” “necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health,” or “relating to the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources.”165 The Panel in US Gambling interpreted the 
term public morals to mean as the “standards of right and wrong conduct 
maintained by or on behalf of a community or nation,” and public order as 
“the preservation of the fundamental interests of a society, as reflected in 
public policy and law.”166 While this interpretation arguably allows for 
countries to make allowances to protect environmental, human rights, it 
also requires individual nations to act responsibly. This kind of 
individualized response does not have the magnitude of impact necessary to 
deter, resolve, or amend human rights violations, unless the countries are 
major trading partners. In that case, though, the sanctioning country would 
also suffer economic consequences for wishing to discipline the other’s 
human rights abuses – not a realistic avenue. 
The European Union has long acknowledged the institutional linkage 
between market access and human rights, as this concept was established as 
a condition of accession to the Union.167 The European Communities have 
also established “links between trade and human rights in domestic trade 
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regulations in the context of granting preferential treatment.”168 Currently, 
the World Trade Organization and its agreements do not establish 
comparable explicit linkages between human rights and trade, but the WTO 
has the power to modify its standards to emphasize compliance with 
environmental, human rights.169 However, the “question arises whether, on 
this basis, institutional links between trade regulation, the rule of law and 
human rights should be institutionally and legally expanded within the 
multilateral trading system of the WTO.”170  
Product-based trade measures in the form of import restrictions appear to 
be an easy way to target products linked to human rights abuses. These 
restrictions could be in the form of ‘inward measures,’ to prevent harms the 
product could cause the restricting State’s population, such as asbestos 
products known to cause cancer.171 ‘Outward measures’ target human rights 
abuses linked to specific products from an exporting State.172 For example, 
products manufactured in conflict conditions and are associated with gross 
human rights violations might be the measure’s targets. Another 
problematic aspect of economic sanctions is that they “treat human beings 
as pawns in a geopolitical game, contrary to the bottom line of human rights 
which treats human beings and ends rather than means.”173 The drawbacks 
to the imposition of economic sanctions on a country as a result of the 
actions of a TNC for whom the state has liability are far-reaching.  
The largest trade giants, such as the US and the EU, would be able to 
impose the strongest unilateral sanctions.174 This impact is the strongest 
when there has been a large pre-existing trade partnership with the 
sanctioned country.175 Additionally, once one country has made the first 
move to condemn another country’s actions through trade sanctions, other 
countries are more likely to follow, increasing the sanction’s 
effectiveness.176  
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U.N. Security Council trade sanctions are incredibly harsh, as “they 
deprive the target State of alternative trading partners.”177 The entirety of 
the U.N. is weighted behind these sanctions, giving them incredible weight. 
It is because of this severity that the Security Council rarely resorts to such 
measures. It is worth noting that Security Council sanctions  
[A]re normally limited rather than comprehensive. Furthermore, 
comprehensive trade sanctions can have the effect of provoking 
nationalistic backlashes and entrenching regimes, rather than 
their presumed desired effect of prompting a disgruntled 
population to force a regime to change its ways.178  
When a government decides it would rather double down than cave to the 
international community’s pressure, the citizens are the ones who suffer the 
consequences. Food shortages, for example, could be prolonged, and in an 
effort to maintain control, governments might further restrict rights. 
Countries should consider expanding criminal responsibility rather 
exposing vulnerable populations to a higher risk of violations in a 
misguided attempt to sanction the responsible entities. 
B. Criminal Responsibility 
Although trade sanctions are theoretically feasible, the potential to 
exacerbate on-going human rights violations disqualifies this route as a 
viable option. Expanding criminal responsibility is possible on either the 
international level through the International Criminal Court (ICC) or 
regional levels through various human rights treaties. These options are 
preferable to the more politically-minded UN International Court of Justice, 
which also only hears state-brought suits.179 Modifying the ICC’s 
jurisdiction to incorporate liability for corporations as well as expanding the 
subject-matter jurisdiction to cover environmental human rights violations 
is the best, slightly idealistic, option. The alternative is incentivizing 
countries to agree to enlarge their regional human rights treaties to include 
corporate responsibility for human rights violations, as Africa is already 
keen to do.  
The concept of corporate criminal liability is not a foreign concept. 
Virtually all developed countries have some form of criminal liability for 
corporations, at the very least for the prohibition of bribes. The ability to 
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hold a corporation and its respective employees liable for their cohesive 
illegal actions easily translates into the realm of international criminal law. 
At present, under the Rome Statute governing the ICC, only natural persons 
can be prosecuted.180  
Other international actors are flirting with the idea of including legal 
persons in the list of potential targets. Special Court for Lebanon, an 
international tribunal, has already charged corporate persons with the 
“willful interference with the administration of justice when disclosing 
confidential information regarding protected witnesses among other 
things.”181 International Humanitarian Law recognizes and binds non-state 
actors to maintaining peace and respecting the rules of war.182 Should the 
African Union’s Malabo Protocol come into operation, it would expand the 
jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice and Human and People’s Rights 
to corporations liable for serious crimes in Africa.183 The Special Court of 
Sierra Leone examined the trafficking of ‘blood diamonds’ in exchange for 
arms Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, the first instance of an African leader 
facing an international tribunal.184 From there “it is not a far stretch to 
imagine a future case in which a business director could stand trial for 
trafficking conflict materials for arms or charges of enslavement in the 
mining of the materials under a theory of indirect co-perpetration.”185 
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It rather seems a matter of time before the Rome Statute is up for 
modification to expand the relevant personhood requirement to include 
corporate entities. Such an expansion would be a major step to closing the 
holes in addressing international corporate liability. There would finally be 
an international body to whom TNCs are directly accountable. The 
European Court of Human Rights, which has been dodging the debate on 
human rights and business, could also see a modification to its Convention, 
officially incorporating corporate criminal liability into the Court’s agenda. 
ICC Jurisdiction can either be exercised because a person is a national of a 
party to the Rome Statute or because the alleged conduct took place within 
the territory of a state party.186 Therefore, the nationality of the relevant 
perpetrators within a company would play a key role; typically, this 
designation would turn on the nationality of the CEO or director. One 
scholar has a theory that would resolve the potential problem that would 
arise should the head of a company not be a national to a state party of the 
Rome Statute that was never physically present in the territory of a state 
party. 
This concern can be addressed by utilizing a theory of a co-
perpetration liability, one who plans, instigates, or orders another 
can be held liable, even if that act was not within the territorial 
confines of a state party so long as the action took place within 
the territory.187 
This method clears the important jurisdictional hurdle posed by the 42 non-
signatory, non-party states.  
Another concern regarding the operation of TNCs that violate human 
rights abuses are the auxiliary crimes that facilitate the carrying out of 
violations. Such crimes include “illegal exploitation of resources, land 
grabbing, corruption, embezzlement, money laundering, or the illegal 
trafficking in arms, human beings, minerals, and drugs.”188 The Rome 
Statute needs to be able to account for these secondary crimes’ contribution 
to the more egregious violations, as they are integral parts to holding TNCs, 
particularly in the extractive industries, responsible. 
Parties to the Rome Statute would need to expand the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the ICC. At present, only crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, genocide, and the crime of aggression are covered in the ICC’s 
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catalogue of crimes.189 It is possible that particularly egregious acts of a 
company, committed either directly or indirectly with the company’s 
support, fit the requirements for crimes against humanity.190 However, for 
the ICC a to have a full scope of power to properly hold TNCs accountable 
for environmental human rights abuses, “ecocide” should be added to the 
list of substantive crimes.. Defined as a “crime of wanton destruction of the 
environment[,] [ecocide] fits within Article 5’s definition as ‘the most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.’” This 
characterization leaves a wide-enough berth to respect the jurisdiction of 
the regional human rights courts, while finally allocating the power to 
punish corporations for their environmental devastation and the resulting 
infringements on human rights. Environmental destruction has the capacity 
to diminish the human rights of entire populations. The safeguarding of the 
environment is an essential task in ensuring that individuals can fully enjoy 
their rights, but no international court yet has the explicit power to hold 
persons responsible for environmental degradation and the resulting effects 
on communities. Incorporating environmental protection and individual 
liability in tandem would force TNCs to adopt better business practices that 
benefit the environment and local populations 
V. Conclusion 
The search for an international system to hold TNCs liable for the 
various environmental and human rights abuses that have become almost 
synonymous with those in the extractive industries begins with examining 
the successful avenues of redress for victims. The European Court of 
Human Rights has been successful in using Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights to hold countries responsible for the 
environmental wrongs originating within its jurisdiction. While the ECtHR 
is limited in holding corporations directly responsible, the solidification of 
state responsibility for TNC activity helps highlight the legal safe place in 
which corporations are untouchable.  
When trying to reconcile the international legal system with corporate 
accountability, two potential pathways emerge. Relying on the “No Harm” 
principle of state responsibility, the WTO, its Member States, and the 
United Nations could use unilateral, regional, and international trade 
sanctions to hold nations responsible for the actions of private corporations 
for whom States are vicariously responsible. This tactic, however, is 
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dangerous. Adding economic pressure to an already instable and oppressive 
situation would more than likely lead to intensified human rights violations 
by aggravating critical conditions for an already-vulnerable population. 
This approach could pressure reluctant states toward the alternative option, 
and away from unsavory economic sanctions.  
The second route involves expanding the criminal jurisdiction of the ICC 
to allow States or individuals to bring suit against TNCs for their 
destructive operations and complicity in human rights violations. As the 
only international court of its kind, allowing international prosecution for 
individual’s crimes, the International Criminal Court is the perfect venue 
and ripe for an overhaul to follow suit with more recent criminal tribunals. 
The Rome Statute would also benefit from an expansion of its subject 
matter jurisdiction for an effective, comprehensive approach to TNC 
liability. Expanding the crimes for which individuals and corporations 
could be prosecuted to include environmental crimes directly, rather than 
relying on human rights violations as a proxy, the ICC could pioneer a new 
international focus on environmental wrongs and the human rights 
violations that accompany them. Rather than solely focusing on the 
involvement of States and oppressive regimes, this method seeks to sew up 
the gaping holes in international law which let TNCs often continue their 
cyclical pattern of harmful behavior.  
This paper serves to identify potential methods that the international 
community could use to police the oft-egregious behavior of TNCs. Its 
purpose is to gently nudge the actors of the extractive industries into 
compliance with human rights violations, noting that the international 
community is slowly warming up to the idea of crossing the traditional 
norms of international responsibility to check the relatively unfettered 
corporate world. While such a radical overhaul is not likely to happen in the 
next several decades, common-law countries in particular are showing a 
surprisingly brazen acceptance of foreign corporate liability, which should, 
at the very least, nudge oil and gas corporations operating internationally to 
reexamine their operations. 
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